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Chapter 12 
Christianity's Epicurean Temptation 
Marc D. Guerra 
One of the more striking characteristics of Christianity is the remarkable resilience 
and flexibility the religion exhibits in the face of the kind of societal upheaval that 
necessarily accompanies fundamental political change. Beginning with its 
emergence within the Roman Empire, organized Christianity has not only survived 
but, to greater and lesser degrees, flourished under an extraordinarily wide range 
of political regimes. To cite only a few examples, the Christian religion has 
managed to accommodate itself to such diverse sociopolitical arrangements as the 
Roman Empire, medieval feudalism, the Holy Roman Empire, the Italian city-
states, absolute monarchies, liberal democracies, and even, if only on the level of 
basic survival, atheistic communist states. 
Christianity's ability to accommodate itself to the sociopolitical arrangements of 
such fundamentally different regimes is, in large part, due to its inherently 
doctrinal nature. As a revealed religion, Christianity is finally less concerned with 
delineating a detailed moral-political code by which its followers are to lead their 
lives than it is with announcing "the Good News" of the arrival of the Kingdom of 
Heaven. To be sure, the Christian religion does promulgate a law that includes a 
substantive moral teaching. But the goal of Christianity's Law is the possession of 
eternal blessedness, not the juridical establishment of a specific sociopolitical 
program. Christianity in this respect stands in sharp contrast to the two other great 
revealed religions of the West, Judaism and Islam. Whereas it is adherence to their 
respective divine laws that marks the Jew and the Muslim as believers, Christianity 
initially comes to sight as a transpolitical "sound doctrine."' The community of 
Christian believers is bound together not by any comprehensive legal and social 
system, but rather by a shared belief in a set of revealed doctrines. Justification 
within Christianity therefore does not depend merely on the obligatory performance 
oflegally sanctioned deeds, but on the purity and the steadfastness of a man's faith. 
Precisely because they recognized the gospel's emphasis on the salvific role of 
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faith, Christianity's early intellectual caretakers understood that the Sacred 
Scriptures were in need of further theological refinement. The church fathers 
recognized that since human beings were to be judged on the purity of their faith, 
what has been revealed about God must be rendered as accurately and lucidly as 
possible. Viewed from this perspective, Christianity's failure to provide either its 
own paradigm for the correct ordering of society or to endorse any existing set of 
arrangements is a direct consequence of its transpolitical nature. 
Recently, however, a number of Christian thinkers have provocatively 
questioned the legitimacy of the modem liberal regime. Liberal democracy has 
been increasingly criticized not only for failing to support but also for actually 
eroding the intellectual grounds on which the Christian faith is based. This 
argument is forcefully advanced in Kenneth R. Craycraft's engaging and, at times, 
jarring new book The American Myth of Religious Freedom.2 A former professor 
of theology at St. Mary's University in San Antonio who is presently a student at 
the Law School at Duke University, Craycraft here "sets out" to deconstruct "the 
idea" of religious freedom in order to expose its "radically secular" roots. 
It should be clear from the foregoing remarks that the argument of The American 
Myth of Religious Freedom clearly falls outside of the familiar parameters of 
mainstream religious and political thought. While the book's title suggests thatthe 
work is concerned primarily with the American understanding of religious 
freedom, its author advances an argument that is in truth directed not at America 
or even the "liberal American idea" ofreligious freedom, but rather at the principle 
ofliberalism itself. Kenneth Craycraft' s engaging book, in other words, challenges 
the reader to consider the kind of untimely religious critique of liberalism that 
characterized the Catholic Church's discourse for most of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. 
The "lrreligion" of Religious Freedom 
The American Myth of Religious Freedom begins with a discussion of how 
pervasive "belief' in the idea of religious freedom is in present-day political 
discourse. Craycraft, using the language of postmodern literary theory, repeatedly 
refers to the idea of religious liberty as a "myth." The impact this "powerful 
formative myth" has had and continues to have on the American psyche cannot be 
exaggerated for Craycraft. On the one hand, "the myth" of religious freedom 
originally served a "creative purpose" in the American regime. By articulating "a 
set of symbols, rites, institutions, and stories that ... reflect how [the American 
people would] see the world," it provided them with "a common story." On the 
other hand, the power of this myth remains formative inasmuch as it continues to 
"create" the "mindset . . . and prejudices" of future generations of American 
citizens. The American myth of religious freedom paradoxically perpetuates itself · 
and the regime it helped found.3 For Craycraft, the effect of this myth is so strong 
that even those who claim that the American regime was founded on Christian 
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principles typically cling to an "unquestioned belief' in the principle of religious 
liberty. Insofar as conservative-minded Americans think of themselves as 
Americans, they implicitly and inescapably "testify" to the truth of this myth. 
Craycraft's analysis of the pervasiveness ofbeliefin religious liberty in America 
is for the most part correct. But, as we shall see, Craycraft's postmodern reduction 
of "the idea" of religious freedom to mere myth does not do justice to the partial 
truth that is contained in this idea. For postmodernism's literary method of 
mythological analysis dogmatically assumes that the idea of religious liberty can 
be reduced to mere ideology. The flaw in Craycraft's postmodern approach, in 
other words, is that it is methodologically incapable of taking seriously the 
possibility that there is a considered thoughtfulness behind the political idea of 
religious liberty. 
Be that as it may, for Craycraft the problem with the myth ofreligious freedom 
is that followed to its logical conclusion it "undermines ... belief in Christianity 
defined in any interesting way.''4 That Craycraft is aware of the theoretical problem 
the liberal principle ofreligious freedom poses to Christianity shows he has thought 
about the relation ofliberalism to Christianity more seriously than the majority of 
contemporary Christian theologians and political scientists. Rather than simply 
accepting religious freedom as an unqualified good for religion, Craycraft has 
taken the time to think through the argument behind that theory. Craycraft is thus 
aware of the principle's original intentions as well as its actual implications. 
The "liberal theory of religious freedom" institutionalizes the practice of 
religious liberty by raising it up to the level of a universal principle. Consequently, 
it first presents itself as a good not only for the political order but for religion as 
well. To begin with, the theory has the obvious, salutary effect of curbing the threat 
that human beings will be persecuted solely on religious grounds. Given the 
bloodied history of religious strife that characterized life in early post-Reformation 
Europe, the fact that public-spirited political thinkers sought to find an arrangement 
that could lessen the likelihood of such conflict is more than understandable. What 
is more, the theory of religious liberty seems to benefit religious practice as well. 
The adherence to the religion of one's own choosing would appear to represent a 
deeper commitment to one's faith. Thus, on the surface, the type of religion 
practiced under the principle of religious freedom seems to be more pure, if only 
because it reflects "the authentically free" choice of the "unencumbered self. "5 
But as Craycraft explains over several chapters, behind the theory's salutary 
interest in the health of religious practice lies an implicit, willful rejection of the 
truth of religion in general and of any one religion in particular. While not saying 
so directly, Craycraft here draws on the ground-breaking work of the twentieth-
century political philosopher Leo Strauss in retracing how the chief architect of the 
theory of religious liberty, John Locke, sought to move religion out of the public 
sphere and relegate it to the private realm of civil society. As Craycraft repeatedly 
observes, for Locke the place ofreligion in society "is the first problem of political 
theory and practice.''6 Craycraft's ahistorical genealogy, however, fails to 
acknowledge any legitimate historical or political basis for this concern in the early 
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modem period. Craycraft goes so far as to claim that the motivation behind the 
theory had "nothing to do with social or historical expediency and everything to do 
with a particular moral, religious, and political theory."7 In contrast to mainline 
political theorists who view the Two Treatise of Government as Locke's most 
influential work, Craycraft takes A Letter Concerning Toleration to be his "most 
important contribution to ... modern political theory."8 
In the Letter, Locke extrapolates from his argument about life within ''the 
hypothetical state of nature" the moral and religious principles that the modern 
state would use to go about "privatizing religious belief." Building on the 
anthropology of Thomas Hobbes, which grounds political life on a pre-moral fact, 
namely, man's fear ofa violent death at the hands of another, Locke identified the 
desire for "comfortable self-preservation" as the true grounds of civil society. 
Locke thus derived from this pre-moral fact the further conclusion "that religion 
is something one chooses from a position of moral, social, and religious 
autonomy. "9 As Craycraft' s argument shows, the reason why Locke's theory could 
require that religious belief be privatized-that is, that religious belief has no 
explicit role to play in public life-was because Locke was "openly indifferent" to 
the various truth claims that separated religions. The animating concern of 
"liberalism's Lockean theory of religious liberty" is thus neither philosophical nor 
theological, but overtly political. Locke's principal aim was to secure a peaceful 
arrangement among religions by according them all the same degree of freedom 
and political status, and thus "relativizing" all religious belief. In securing such an 
arrangement, liberalism proudly, and as Craycraft notes, falsely claims to have 
solved the theoretically irresolvable "theologico-political problem."1° Far from 
having the best interests of religion in mind, Locke's principle of religious 
toleration presented the liberal state with a time bomb designed to "privatize and 
marginalize orthodox" religious belief. 11 
Liberalism's theory of religious freedom is thus, according to Craycraft, a wolf 
in sheep's clothing. It feigns a concern for the well-being ofreligious belief but in 
fact employs a fictive anthropology to liberate man from what it sees as the 
tyrannical hold of religious belief. Craycraft develops this point at length in the 
book's final chapter, titled "There's No Such Thing as Religious Freedom, and It's 
No Big Deal." As the chapter's title suggests, Craycraft here follows the lead of the 
postmodern literary theorist Stanley Fish. What Craycraft successfully brings to 
light is the typically overlooked fact that the theory of religious freedom is actually 
only a part, albeit an important one, of the larger "project of liberalism." Indeed, 
despite what the title of his book suggests, the true target of Craycraft' s criticism 
is not the American idea of religious freedom or the practice of religious liberty, 
but liberalism itself. In particular, Craycraft objects to liberalism's claim to have 
"found a set of objective, neutral principles, by which objective universal 
judgments can be made."12 
The real strength of Craycraft' s critique rests on his undeveloped recognition that 
the liberal regime poses a new type of challenge to the integrity of Christianity. 
Craycraft understands that American liberal democracy is something new under the 
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sun-it is not merely a variation of the ancient republican model. In fact, for all 
practical purposes, modern liberal democracy is incapable of being understood 
simply within the framework of the more or less legitimate regimes traditionally 
articulated by Aristotelian political science.13 Because it raises the principle of 
democracy, consent, to the level of the single legitimizing principle in human life, 
liberal democracy effectively breaks with the sempiternal natural cycle of regimes 
set forth in Aristotle's Politics. Compared to modern liberal democracy, Periclean 
Athens and republican Rome were both aristocratic regimes. As the great analyst 
of democracy Alexis de Tocqueville observed, the predemocratic and democratic 
worlds differ "almost in kind." Consequently, the types of men that each world 
tends to produce "are like two distinct orders of human beings, each of which has 
its own merits and defects, its own advaqtages and its own evils."14 
In Craycraft's view, the effectual truth of the liberal regime's relation to religion 
is that it seeks to establish "irreligion as the official state-endorse[ d] religious 
opinion."15 The liberal regime's emphasis on consent has the effect of calling into 
question not only the transpolitical claim of Christian faith, as every regime does, 
but also the very ground on which this transpolitical claim is made. In an unsubtle 
and heavy-handed chapter titled "From Theory to Practice: Madison and 
Jefferson," Craycraft argues that the "great task" of establishing irreligion as the 
official state religion of America was taken up by Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison. Through a process of"literary genealogy," Craycraft tries to show how 
these two "great practitioners" of Locke went about "enshrining" his antireligious 
doctrine in the First Amendment. Craycraft here paints with extremely broad and 
often misleading strokes; he too easily identifies or perhaps reduces both Jefferson 
and Madison to Locke and thus overstates the element of genuinely Lockean 
thought in the American founding. Thus, in making his case against liberalism's 
theory of religious liberty, Craycraft refuses to be deterred by stubborn facts such 
as Jefferson's description of the Declaration oflndependence "as an expression of 
the American mind" and not just of his own thought. Likewise, Craycraft is 
unwilling to admit that while it is not wholly Christian, Madison's moving account 
of liberty and conscience in the Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious 
Assessments is in some sense indebted to the Christian understanding of these 
things.16 
Craycraft' s exaggerated account of the Lockean dimension of the American 
founding explains why he views the Supreme Court's decision on the strict 
separation of church and state in Everson v. Board of Education ( 194 7) as 
accurately reflecting the framers' position. For Craycraft, religious conservatives 
who think the Court's decision woefully distorted the framers' argument on 
church-state relations typically make the mistake of identifying the religious 
sentiment of the general population at the time of the founding with the stance of 
the founders themselves: 
Now it is probably unarguable that the broadly popular sentiment at the 
time of the American Founding was that the state ought to protect 
religious freedom ... but to claim that the intention of the Constitution 
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of the United States is to protect religion from the state rather than the 
state from religion is simple legal and historical fiction. 17 
Over and against the vacuity of the liberal theory of religious freedom, Craycraft 
holds up the "authentic grounds of religious freedom" articulated in the Second 
Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Liberty. Like the liberal myth of 
religious freedom, the council's Declaration also attempts to establish "a full range 
of religious freedom" for all human beings. But in contrast to the groundless 
character of the liberal notion of religious freedom, the Roman Catholic Church's 
teaching is able to provide a solid basis for this freedom by reserving ''the highest 
order of freedom for itself as Church." The Declaration on Religious Liberty does 
this by carving out for the church a particular kind of freedom, one that is grounded 
in its "distinct right" as the repository of religious and moral truth. As the unique 
repository of Christ's revelation, the freedom that the church exercises supersedes 
the freedom possessed by the non-Christian. 
Craycraft is undoubtedly right to draw attention to the fact that the Vatican 
Council's Declaration provides the principle ofreligious liberty with a truer, more 
solid foundation than its impoverished Lockean counterpart. But again it must be 
pointed out that Craycraft provides a rather one-sided and simplistic reading of the 
history of religion in America. On the basis of reading Craycraft, for example, one 
would get the impression that the American Revolution was explicitly and 
unapologetically atheistic. But this simply is not the case. In contrast to the vitriolic 
antireligious spirit of the French Revolution, the American Revolution 
demonstrated a greater openness to and respect for religion. Furthermore, while the 
heterodox nature of Madison's and Jefferson's religious beliefs has been 
recognized for some time now, the same cannot be said of all of the 
founders-something Craycraft' s argument implies. Craycraft simply ignores or 
thinks unimportant the fact that while the founding fathers may not have been 
"orthodox Christians" (an ambiguous phrase that Craycraft in the end appears to 
identify with Catholics), the majority were in fact Christians of some sort. 
Craycraft' s argument simply cannot account for the role played in the founding by 
mainline Protestants such as James Wilson or even those Unitarians who believed 
in a providential, Creator God. Simply put, what Craycraft refuses to recognize is 
that not all of the founders worshipped at the altar of modem rationalist 
philosophy. 
Along similar lines, Craycraft's effort to reduce the history of religion in 
America to the effects of Madison's and Jefferson's Lockeanism is also misplaced. 
The actual history of religion in America is far more complex. Craycraft has a 
tendency to overstate the degree to which political life, even modem political life, 
can be understood simply as the application of theory to practice. Craycraft 
consequently never takes seriously the possibility that the American founders may 
have arrived at a prudential practical solution to the problem of religious belief. A 
more accurate and more subtle appraisal of the American regime would have to 
acknowledge that America's lived history of religion is richer than the regime's 
partially Lockean theory. In short, what he fails to realize is that the American 
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regime's prudential accommodation of religious belief defies any purely theoretical 
account. 
Craycraft toys with, but finally rejects, this possibility in a provocative chapter 
titled "Catholic Irony? John Courtney Murray on Religious Freedom." Taking his 
cue from Peter Augustine Lawler's original reading of We Hold These Truths, 
Craycraft here offers a similar, and in some sense derivative, reading of Murray's 
famous book. 18 Craycraft's purpose is to show that Murray's famed 
"reconciliation" between the moral and religious demands of Christianity and the 
principles of American democracy is "ironic." Craycraft, rightly it seems to me, 
sees the interpretive key for understanding the argument of We Hold These Truths 
as being revealed in Murray's remark in the introduction that 
the question is sometimes raised, whether Catholicism is compatible 
with American democracy. The question is invalid as well as 
impertinent; for the matter of its position inverts the order of values. It 
must, of course, be turned round to read, whether American democracy 
is compatible with Catholicism.19 
Craycraft here sets forth a compelling case that Murray was not as unaware of 
the non-Christian, and especially non-Catholic, elements in the American founding 
as he is commonly thought to have been. Whereas conventional wisdom sees 
Murray as trying to accommodate Catholic teaching to the political principles set 
forth in the Declaration, Craycraft argues that precisely the opposite is true. Far 
from attempting to forge some type of synthesis between the two, or suggesting 
that Catholic thought could deepen or prudently elevate Jefferson's thought, 
Craycraft's Murray actually "rejected" America's constitutional understanding of 
religion "out of hand." For Craycraft, "Murray [was] not accepting the essential 
philosophy of Jefferson and improving it with a little Catholic theology." Rather, 
he was trying to offer "a distinctively Christian understanding of how a Christian 
can live in America. "20 
Craycraft is right to call attention to the elegance and subtlety of the argument 
of We Hold These Truths. But he errs inasmuch as he mistakes Murray's subtlety 
for "irony." Murray's argument is not fueled by the kind of postmodern irony that 
delights in hiding the fact that it "rejects" the American principles "out of hand," 
but rather by the kind of theoretical-practical sobriety that seeks to moderate the 
excesses of American democracy from within.21 As Lawler points out, Murray's 
true genius consisted in his recognition that as a political act, the American 
founding finally could not claim theoretical coherence. Murray recognized that 
despite all efforts to the contrary, the various moral, religious, and political 
principles articulated in the American founding did not, and could not, form a 
theoretically coherent whole-hence Jefferson spoke of "the American mind" and 
not the "American philosophy." This then explains why Murray affirmed a tension 
at the heart of the founding between "a voluntarist idea of law as will" and "a 
tradition of natural law as inheritance . . . as an . . . intellectualist idea. "22 The 
problem of radical autonomy or liberty severed from any end that plagues America 
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today was thus "a possibility . . . inherent from the beginning. "23 What Craycraft 
fails to appreciate, in other words, is that Murray's way of writing has more in 
common with the sophisticated moderation of a Burke than with the dilettantish 
irony of the postmodernist. 
What are we thus to make of the fact that Murray chose subtly to elevate 
America's liberal principles whereas Craycraft chooses to shout his rejection of 
these principles from the rooftop? Does not Murray's choice to moderate the 
American regime from within say something profound about his understanding of 
the relation of the Christian to the regime in which he lives? Conversely, does not 
Craycraft's refusal to use the same kind of politically responsible or prudent 
rhetoric finally suggest something entirely different? 
This brings us to the real flaw in Craycraft's argument. The fundamental problem 
with Craycraft' s book is not in its hyperbolic claim that Christians ought not accept 
"the principles of the American Founding"24 nor in its odd suggestion that the 
"degeneration" of the "liberty of constitutionalism ... is not ... important to 
Christians."25 Such remarks, no matter how politically irresponsible, are in the end 
only the products of Craycraft's remarkable belief that Christians actually have no 
genuine stake in political life. The reason why Craycraft can claim that the 
nonexistence of religious liberty is "no big deal" is actually because he believes 
that citizenship has no real role to play in the life of the Christian. 
Christianity is, for Craycraft, not merely transpolitical but in fact radically 
apolitical. Christians consequently have "no real stake" in the political order. Nor, 
for that matter, do they have any interest in "changing it in any fundamental 
way."26 Quite the contrary, the Christian's only real "interest is ... to persuade 
people to believe by witnessing to the resurrection of Christ, who ... relativizes all 
political theories and who commands that people bind themselves to no one."27 
What is startling about Craycraft's claim is the remarkable similarity it bears to the 
atheistic doctrine of Epicurus. Like Epicureanism, Craycraft's position does more 
than simply depreciate the importance of political life. Craycraft does not limit 
himself to saying that Christians should not be consumed by political life, but 
rather that they have "no real stake" or "interest" in it. Christians' concerns with 
political life are solely negative; it should not disturb or interfere with their own 
private concerns. Craycraft, for all practical purposes, agrees with the description 
of the Christian that the anti-Christian Rousseau offers in the penultimate chapter 
of the Social Contract: he is a citizen only in the most attenuated sense of the term. 
Craycraft's apolitical stance explains why he fails to articulate any positive 
political vision. Strictly speaking, Craycraft's argument is neither genuinely 
conservative, since there is nothing in liberalism he wants to preserve, nor 
authentically reactionary, since he does not call for a return to an earlier form of 
clerical politics. It is rather entirely critical. For Craycraft, what matters is only that 
Christians be allowed to live their lives as Christians. 
Paradoxically, by not addressing the question of citizenship, Craycraft departs 
from the very tradition of Christian political reflection he sees himselfupholding. 
Christianity traditionally has recognized that because of its doctrinal nature it must 
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look outside of itself for its political form. But with this realization comes a 
challenge. How does one account for Christian participation in political life if 
human beings ultimately are ordered to a good that transcends the political? 
Generally speaking, Christianity has offered two types of responses to this 
question, the Augustinian and the Thomistic. By offering a brief sketch of these 
two positions, we bring into sharper focus the distinctively Christian reasons for 
rejecting Craycraft's call for apolitical withdrawal. 
The Two Poles of Christian Citizenship 
The complicated relationship Christianity has to political life had become apparent 
as early as one century after Christ's death. The anonymous Letter to Diognetus, 
for example, describes Christians as "aliens" for whom "every foreign land is their 
fatherland, and yet for them every fatherland is a foreign land since . . . [their] true 
citizenship is in heaven." Despite this fact, Christians ought to "live in their own 
countries ... have a share in everything as citizens and ... obey the established 
laws. "28 But as the overall argument of the Letter to Diognetus makes clear, it is 
taken for granted that the Christian faithful would participate in political life. The 
author of the Letter thus does not attempt to give any particular reason why 
Christians would or should participate in politics. The Christian thinker who would 
be the first to take up this argument in a serious way was St. Augustine . 
It is of no small significance that St. Augustine formulated his teaching about the 
actual grounds of Christian citizenship precisely at the time when Christianity was 
being blamed for the inglorious sacking of Rome by Alaric and the Goths. St. 
Augustine himself states in his Retractationes that he was first moved to write The 
City of God out of a desire to defend Christianity from this charge.29 St. 
Augustine's aim in writing The City of God was in fact twofold: (1) to argue that 
Rome and not Christianity was actually responsible for the empire's recent 
setbacks, and (2) to show public-spirited Romans that they could convert to the 
Christian faith and still be good citizens. 
St. Augustine's famous argument that the day-to-day life of the Christian is 
marked by a kind of dual citizenship in which he is at one and the same time a 
member of the "City of Man" and a citizen of the "City of God" is based on his 
reading of chapter 13 of St. Paul's Letter to the Romans. St. Paul, there, asserts that 
the Christian, who views God as his highest authority, must also be obedient to 
civil authorities, since God has appointed them as His political ministers on earth. 30 
Through temporal rulers, God makes use of civil society as a coercive means for 
controlling, or at least lessening, the effects of evil in the world. What is more, God 
has entrusted temporal rulers with the care of those material goods that all human 
beings, the Christian and non-Christian, need to make their way in this life. In 
contrast to the majority of men, the Christian does not obey the temporal ruler 
simply out of fear that he might be punished.31 Quite the contrary, the Christian 
236 Marc D. Guerra 
views his relation to the political authority "positively" and thus looks on his 
"political obligations" as something approximating a religious duty.32 
There is, however, for St. Augustine a still deeper reason why Christians are to 
take part in political life. Ultimately the political actions the Christian performs as 
a citizen are "rooted" in the demands of the theological virtue of charity. 
Christianity's injunction that one should love one's neighbor as himself-the exact 
opposite of the asocial injunction ofEpicureanism-meant that the Christian was 
obligated to devote himself to the good of his fellow citizen with an intensity that 
had yet to be seen in the ancient world. The virtue of charity required that if one 
truly was to love God one also had to love all those who God wants to be saved. 
But St. Augustine, also, was aware that if such love was to mean anything it could 
not simply take the form of an abstract love ofhumanity. St. Augustine thus spoke 
of "the order of charity," which extends from those in one's immediate family up 
through and including those fellow members of one's political community. In 
practical terms, "the order of charity" meant that while the gospel charged that "all 
men were to be loved equally," one principally has to care for those men "who are 
most closely bound to you by place, time, or opportunity."33 There was, for St. 
Augustine, a charitable reason then to defend civilization against barbarism, to side 
with the vices of the Romans over against the savageness of the Goths. The virtue 
of charity, in other words, obliged the Christian to care for his fellow citizen's 
physical and psychic well-being, to care for him "as a whole embracing both a soul 
and a body. "34 
The actual ground of Christian citizenship would thus find its first, and arguably 
most explicitly theological, articulation in St. Augustine's thought. For St. 
Augustine, Christianity was able to transform the classical notion of citizenship by 
raising it to the level of a religious duty. By so doing, it effectively revealed that 
nothing else was capable of producing 
such provincial administrators, such husbands. such wives, such 
parents, such sons, such masters, such slaves, sucll kings, such judges, 
and finally such tax-payers and collectors of public revenue as Christian 
teaching requires them to be, and let them dare say this teaching is 
opposed to the welfare of the state, or, rather, let them even hesitate to 
admit that it is the greatest safety of the state. 35 
St. Thomas, who in contrast to St. Augustine Hwed within a recognizably 
Christian social order, approached the question of Christian citizenship from a 
different direction. Whereas St. Augustine spoke of citizenship in terms of its 
charitable foundations, St. Thomas, following Aristotle, viewed politics as being 
an essential part of human life. 36 St. Thomas, unlike St. Augustine, could therefore 
view political life as natural to man. "Man," St. Thomas affirmed, is "by nature 
both a social and political animal."37 
However, while man is the most social and political of all animals, he is also the 
most physically needy. And it is this fact that first inclines him to live in society. 
By nature, the first society to which man belongs is the family or "the household." 
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Yet the good of the family is at best only "a partial good," since its principle aim 
is the procurement of those goods that allow for and sustain life. But even the 
family, ruled as it is by economics or the art of household management, is 
incapable of securing all the goods human beings need to survive. Consequently, 
St. Thomas saw the family as being completed by the political community, which 
being the greater and the more perfect community both incorporates and subsumes 
all lesser communities to its own end. 38 
But because he is also a rational animal, it is not sufficient merely that man 
"lives, but that he lives well."39 Indeed, as St. Thomas states in his discussion of the 
natural law, man's distinctively human natural inclination inclines him both "to 
know the truth and to live in society.''40 Once again following Aristotle, St. Thomas 
believed that such genuine human flourishing could occur only within the political 
community, "the most perfect ofall human societies."41 Unlike the household, the 
political community attains a level of self-sufficiency. But what is more important, 
however, is that while the end of the family is the promotion oflife, the end of the 
political community is the cultivation of virtue in human beings. And this elevated 
good is "common" to all citizens. St. Thomas in fact bases his notion of citizenship 
on the recognition that the type of virtue that develops from engaging in such 
activities as self-rule or ruling and being ruled in turn are important parts of any 
genuinely human life. The good habits instilled in those who live under well-
ordered and just laws, something that takes on slightly greater importance in 
Christianity given its transpolitical claim, represent authentic human goods. As a 
result, St. Thomas views the common good as constituting the "proper," over and 
against the merely private, good of the citizen.42 To be sure, St. Thomas believed 
that the kind of natural perfection that citizenship cultivates is inferior to the 
supernatural perfection that can come about only through the reception of God's 
grace. But insofar as grace does not destroy but perfects nature, it remains true that 
man's spiritual perfection does not negate the legitimate, natural perfection that 
occurs within political life. Thus, for St. Thomas, only the man who is "depraved, 
a beast as it were ... or the man who is better than a man, a god as it were," is 
capable of living outside of civil society.43 
Conclusion 
Despite his argument to the contrary, Craycraft admits that Christians cannot 
simply withdraw from political life. How else can one explain why he has taken the 
time to write a work of political theory that passionately warns Christians about the 
theological dangers of liberalism. This inconsistency in fact points to the real 
source of his objection to the liberal regime. On the surface, Craycraft faults 
liberalism for falsely believing that it has found a solution to the theologicopolitical 
problem. The liberal regime, however, can make this claim only by denying the 
tension that persists between the requirements of political life and the duties of 
religious belief. But in his own way, Craycraft wants to do the same thing. In the 
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final analysis, what he objects to is the fact that the liberal regime refuses to 
acknowledge the authority and the primacy of the truths contained in Christian 
revelation. Stated differently, Craycraft is critical of the liberal political order 
precisely because it fails to take "the truth claim" of Christianity seriously. But 
what Craycraft's criticism fails, or is perhaps unwilling, to recognize is that the 
political order can only look at religion from the perspective of the political order. 
To acknowledge this point is not to reduce all faiths to civil religions or to view 
them solely in terms of their utility. Rather, it is simply to acknowledge that the 
political order as the political order has nothing to say about the truth of a particular 
religion. To expect more than this from the political order, which is what Craycraft 
repeatedly does, is to assume that the theologicopolitical problem can be solved.44 
What Craycraft seems to call for is for the political order to be ruled by a 
philosopher-king, or a theologian-king, who divines the truths of a religion and 
structures the entire political community around them. This is ultimately what it 
would mean to have a political community that both embodies and upholds the 
principles of religious liberty set forth in the Vatican Council's Declaration. And 
it goes without saying that such an arrangement requires one to go far beyond the 
requirements and limits of the order of charity. 
What is most regrettable about Craycraft' s extremist apolitical conclusions is that 
they will allow some critics to overlook the important question about the 
relationship between Christianity and liberal democracy that his book raises. The 
analysis of the origins and ends of the liberal regime in The American Myth of 
Religious Freedom should raise troubling questions for those Christians who 
dogmatically assume that liberal democracy is the only form of government 
compatible with Christianity. But regrettably, by framing his question in such a 
polarizing way-should Christianity endorse liberal democracy or reject 
it?-Craycraft only succeeds in obfuscating the fact that Christianity's original 
rapprochement with liberal democracy was prudential. 
Craycraft's book demonstrates that what Christianity most needs today is 
political theorists and theologians who neither uncritically celebrate liberal 
democracy nor reject it out of hand. Contemporary Christianity is best served by 
theologians and political theorists who retain a certain critical distance from liberal 
democracy, even as they praise its virtues and possibilities. The merit of such 
thinkers is that they affirm the decency of liberal democracy and its various 
attendant goods: civic peace, religious freedom, self-government, constitutionalism, 
while refusing to make idols of them. Such critical friends ofliberal democracy are 
profoundly aware of the fact that liberty worthy of the name must be ordered 
liberty. The Christian political theorist or theologian, in other words, is presently 
called on to perform the necessary and salutary task of reminding liberal 
democracy about something it once knew-that it relies on inherited . 
extrademocratic goods, such as religion and morality, for its health and survival.45 
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